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Abstract In this paper, we study the distribution and behaviour of internal
equilibria in a d-player n-strategy random evolutionary game where the game
payoff matrix is generated from normal distributions. The study of this paper
reveals and exploits interesting connections between evolutionary game theory
and random polynomial theory. The main contributions of the paper are some
qualitative and quantitative results on the expected density, fn,d, and the
expected number, E(n, d), of (stable) internal equilibria. Firstly, we show that
in multi-player two-strategy games, they behave asymptotically as
√
d− 1 as d
is sufficiently large. Secondly, we prove that they are monotone functions of d.
We also make a conjecture for games with more than two strategies. Thirdly,
we provide numerical simulations for our analytical results and to support the
conjecture. As consequences of our analysis, some qualitative and quantitative
results on the distribution of zeros of a random Bernstein polynomial are also
obtained.
Keywords Random evolutionary games · Internal equilibria · Random
polynomials · Multi-player games
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been proven to be a suitable mathemat-
ical framework to model biological and social evolution whenever the success
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of an individual depends on the presence or absence of other strategies [34,
27,39]. EGT was introduced in 1973 by Smith and Price [35] as an applica-
tion of classical game theory to biological contexts, and has since then been
widely and successfully applied to various fields, not only biology itself, but
also ecology, population genetics, and computational and social sciences [34,
4,27,39,10,41,23,17]. In these contexts, the payoff obtained from game inter-
actions is translated into reproductive fitness or social success [27,39]. Those
strategies that achieve higher fitness or are more successful, on average, are
favored by natural selection, thereby increase in their frequency. Equilibrium
points of such a dynamical system are the compositions of strategy frequencies
where all the strategies have the same average fitness. Biologically, they pre-
dict the co-existence of different types in a population and the maintenance
of polymorphism.
As in classical game theory with the dominant concept of Nash equilibrium
[37,36], the analysis of equilibrium points in random evolutionary games is of
great importance because it allows one to describe various generic properties,
such as the overall complexity of interactions and the average behaviours,
in a dynamical system. Understanding properties of equilibrium points in a
concrete system is important, but what if the system itself is not fixed or
undefined? Analysis of random games is insightful for such scenarios. To this
end, it is ambitious and desirable to answer the following general questions:
How are the equilibrium points distributed? How do they behave
when the number of players and strategies change?
Mathematical analysis of equilibrium points and their stability in a gen-
eral (multi-player multi-strategy) evolutionary game is challenging because one
would need to cope with systems of multivariate polynomial equations of high
degrees (see Section 2 for more details). Nevertheless, some recent attempts,
both through numerical and analytical approaches, have been made. One ap-
proach is to study the probabilities of having a concrete number of equilibria,
whether all equilibrium points or only the stable ones are counted, if the pay-
off entries follow a certain probability distribution [16,22]. This approach has
the advantage that these probabilities provide elaborate information on the
distribution of the equilibria. However, it consists of sampling and solving of
a system of multivariate polynomial equations; hence is restricted, even when
using numerical simulations, to games of a small number of players and/or
small number of strategies: it is known that it is impossible to (analytically)
solve an algebraic equation of a degree greater than 5 [1]. Another possibil-
ity is to analyze the attainability of the patterns and the maximal number
of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) [34,27], revealing to some extent the
complexity of the interactions. This line of research has been paid much atten-
tion in evolutionary game theory and other biological fields such as population
genetics [28,48,20,7,9,2,16,22,17]. More recently, in [14], the authors investi-
gate the expected number of internal equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy
random evolutionary game where the game payoff matrix is generated from
normal distributions. By connecting EGT and random polynomial theory, they
describe a computationally implementable formula of the mean number of in-
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ternal equilibrium points for the general case, lower and upper bounds the
multi-player two-strategy random games, and a close-form formula for the
two-player multi-strategy games.
In this paper, we address the aforementioned questions, i.e., of analysing
distributions and behaviours of the internal equilibria of a random evolutionary
game, in an average manner. More specifically, we first analyse the expected
density of internal equilibrium points, fn,d(t), i.e. the expected number of such
equilibrium points per unit length at point t, in a d-player n-strategy random
evolutionary game where the game payoff matrix is generated from a normal
distribution (for short, normal evolutionary games). Here the parameter t =
(ti)
n−1
i=1 , with ti =
xi
xn
, denotes the ratio of frequency of strategy i ∈ {1, · · · , n−
1} to that of strategy n, respectively (more details in Section 2). In such a
random game, we then analyse the expected number of internal equilibria,
E(n, d), and, as a result, characterize the expected number of internal stable
equilibria, SE (n, d). We obtain both quantitative (asymptotic formula) and
qualitative (monotone properties) results of fn,d and E(n, d), as functions of
the ratios, t, the number of players, d, and that of strategies, n.
To obtain these results, we develop further the connection between EGT
and random polynomial theory explored in [14], and more importantly, estab-
lish appealing (previously unexplored) connections to the well-known classes
of polynomials, the Bernstein polynomials and Legendre polynomials. In con-
trast to the direct approach used in [16,22], our approach avoids sampling and
solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations, thereby enabling us to
study games with large numbers of players and/or strategies.
We now summarise the main results of the present paper.
1.2 Main results
The main analytical results of the present paper can be summarized into three
categories: asymptotic behaviour of the density function and the expected
number of (stable) equilibria, a connection between the density function with
the Legendre polynomials, and monotonic behaviour of the density function.
In addition, we provide numerical results and illustration for the general games
when both the numbers of players and strategies are large.
To precisely describe our main results, we introduce the following notation
regarding asymptotic behaviour of two given functions u and v : [0,+∞) →
[0,+∞)
u . v ⇔ there exists a positive constant C such that for all k ∈ [0,+∞)
u(k) ≤ Cv(k),
u ∼ v ⇔ it holds that u . v and v . u.
Note that throughout the paper we sometimes put arguments of a function
as subscripts. For instance, the expected density of internal equilibrium points,
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fn,d(t), besides t, is also analyzed as a function of n and d. We will explic-
itly state which parameter(s) is being varied whenever necessary to avoid the
confusion.
The main results of the present paper are the following. As described above,
fn,d(t) denotes the expected number of internal equilibrium points per unit
length at point t, in a d-player n-strategy random evolutionary game where
the game payoff matrix is generated from a normal distribution; E(n, d) the
expected number of internal equilibria; and SE (n, d) the expected number of
internal stable equilibria. The formal definitions of these three functions are
given in Section 2.
(1) In Theorem 1, we prove the following asymptotic behaviour of f2,d(t) for
all t > 0: f2,d(t) ∼
√
d− 1. We also prove that f2,d(t) is always bounded
from above and limd→∞
f2,d(t)
d−1 = 0.
(2) In Theorem 2, we prove a novel upper bound for the expected number
of multi-player two-strategy random games, E(2, d) .
√
d− 1 ln(d − 1)
and obtain its limiting behaviour: lim
d→∞
lnE(2,d)
ln(d−1) =
1
2 . This upper bound
is sharper than the one obtained in [14, Theorem 2], which is, E(2, d) .
(d− 1) 34 . These results lead to two important corollaries. First, we obtain
a sharper bound for the expected number of stable equilibria, SE (2, d) .
1
2
√
d− 1 ln(d − 1), and the corresponding limit, lim
d→∞
lnSE(2,d)
ln(d−1) =
1
2 , see
Corollary 1. The second corollary, Corollary 2, is mathematically signifi-
cant, in which we obtain lower and upper bounds and a limiting behaviour
of the expected number of real zeros of a random Bernstein polynomial.
(3) In Theorem 3, we establish an expression of f2,d(t) in terms of the Legendre
polynomial and its derivative.
(4) In Theorem 4, we express f2,d(t) in terms of the Legendre polynomials of
two consecutive order.
(5) In Theorem 5, we prove that
f2,d(t)
d is a decreasing function of d for any
given t > 0. Consequently, E(2,d)d and
SE(2,d)
d are decreasing functions of
d.
(6) In Proposition 2, we provide a condition for f2,d(t) being an increasing
function of d for any given t > 0. We conjecture that this condition holds
true and support it by numerical simulation.
(7) In Theorem 6, we provide an upper bound for fn,2(t). We also make a
conjecture for fn,d(t) and E(n, d) in the general case (n, d ≥ 3).
(8) We offer numerical illustration for our main results in Section 4.2.
The density function fn,d(t) provides insightful information on the distribution
of the internal equilibria: integrating fn,d(t) over any interval produces the
expected number of real equilibria on that interval. In particular, the expected
number of internal equilibria E(n, d) is obtained by integrating fn,d(t) over the
positive half of the space. Theorem 5 and Proposition 2, which are deduced
from Theorems 3 and 4, are qualitative statements, which tell us how the
expected number of internal equilibria per unit length f2,d in a d-player two-
strategy game changes when the number of players d increases. Theorem 1
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quantifies its behaviour showing that f2,d is approximately (up to a constant
factor) equal to
√
d− 1. The function h(d) := √d− 1, as seen in Theorem 1,
certainly satisfies the properties that h(d) increases but h(d)d decreases. Thus,
it strengthens Theorem 5 and further supports Conjecture 1. Theorem 2 is
also a quantitative statement which provides an asymptotic estimate for the
expected number of internal (stable) equilibria.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the expected number of real zeros
of a random polynomial has been extensively studied, dating back to 1932 with
Block and Po´lya’s seminal paper [6] (see, for instance, [15] for a nice exposition
and [45,38] for the most recent progress). Therefore, our results, in Theorems
2, 3 and 4, provide important, novel insights within the theory of random
polynomials, but also reveal its intriguing connections and applications to
EGT.
1.3 Organisation of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall relevant
details on EGT and random polynomial theory. Section 3 presents full analysis
of the expected density function and the expect number of internal equilibria
of a multi-player two-strategy game. The results on asymptotic behaviour and
on the connection to Legendre polynomials and its applications are given in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. In Section 4, we provide analytical results for
the two-player multi-strategy game and numerical simulations for the general
case. Therein we also make a conjecture about an asymptotic formula for the
density and the expected number of internal equilibria in the general case. In
Section 5, we sum up and provide future perspectives. Finally, some detailed
proofs are presented in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries: replicator dynamics and random polynomials
This section describes some relevant details of the EGT and random polyno-
mial theory, to the extent we need here. Both are classical but the idea of
using the latter to study the former has only been pointed out in our recent
paper [14].
2.1 Replicator dynamics
The classical approach to evolutionary games is replicator dynamics [46,50,
27,44,39], describing that whenever a strategy has a fitness larger than the
average fitness of the population, it is expected to spread. Formally, let us
consider an infinitely large population with n strategies, numerated from 1 to
n. They have frequencies xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively, satisfying that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1
and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The interaction of the individuals in the population is in
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randomly selected groups of d participants, that is, they play and obtain their
fitness from d-player games. We consider here symmetrical games (e.g. the
public goods games and their generalizations [24,26,43,40,21]) in which the
order of the participants is irrelevant. Let αi0i1,...,id−1 be the payoff of the focal
player, where i0 (1 ≤ i0 ≤ n) is the strategy of the focal player, and ik (with
1 ≤ ik ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) be the strategy of the player in position k.
These payoffs form a (d − 1)-dimensional payoff matrix [16], which satisfies
(because of the game symmetry)
αi0i1,...,id−1 = α
i0
i′1,...,i
′
d−1
, (1)
whenever {i′1 . . . , i′d−1} is a permutation of {i1 . . . , id−1}. This means that only
the fraction of each strategy in the game matters.
The equilibrium points of the system are given by the points (x1, . . . , xn)
satisfying the condition that the fitnesses of all strategies are the same, which
can be simplified to the following system of n− 1 polynomials of degree d− 1
[14]
∑
0≤k1,...,kn≤d−1,
n∑
i=1
ki=d−1
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n∏
i=1
xkii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (2)
where βik1,...,kn−1 := α
i
k1,...,kn
− αnk1,...,kn , and
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)
= (d−1)!n∏
k=1
ki!
are the
multinomial coefficients. Assuming that all the payoff entries have the same
probability distribution, then all βik1,...,kn−1 , i = 1, . . . , n− 1, have symmetric
distributions, i.e. with mean 0 [22].
We focus on internal equilibrium points [16,22,14], i.e. 0 < xi < 1 for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Hence, by using the transformation ti = xixn , with 0 < ti < +∞
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, dividing the left hand side of the above equation by xd−1n
we obtain the following equation in terms of (t1, . . . , tn−1) that is equivalent
to (2)
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n−1∏
i=1
tkii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
(3)
Hence, finding an internal equilibria in a general n-strategy d-player random
evolutionary game is equivalent to find a solution (y1, . . . , yn−1) ∈ R+n−1 of
the system of (n−1) polynomials of degree (d−1) in (3). This observation links
the study of generic properties of equilibrium points in EGT to the theory of
random polynomials.
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2.2 Random polynomial theory
Suppose that all βik1,...,kn−1 are Gaussian distributions with mean 0 and vari-
ance 1, then for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), Ai =
{
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
)}
is a
multivariate normal random vector with mean zero and covariance matrix C
given by
C = diag
((
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
)2)
0≤ki≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
. (4)
The density function fn,d and the expected number E(n, d) of equilibria can
be computed explicitly. The lemma below is a direct consequence of [15,
Theorem 7.1] (see also [14, Lemma 1]). For a clarity of notation, we use
bold font to denote an element in high-dimensional Euclidean space such as
t = (t1, . . . , tn−1) ∈ Rn−1.
Lemma 1 Assume that {Ai}1≤i≤n−1 are independent normal random vectors
with mean zero and covariance matrix C as in (4). The expected density of
real zeros of Eq. (3) at a point t = (t1, . . . , tn−1) is given by
fn,d(t) = pi
−n2 Γ
(n
2
)
(detL(t))
1
2 , (5)
where Γ denotes the Gamma function and L(t) the matrix with entries
Lij(t) =
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
,
with
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2 n∏
i=1
xkii y
ki
i . (6)
As a consequence, the expected number of internal equilibria in a d-player
n-strategy random game is determined by
E(n, d) =
∫
Rn−1+
fn,d(t) dt. (7)
Note that the assumption in Lemma 1 is quite limited when applying to games
with more than two strategies as in that case the independence of the α terms
does not carry over into the independence of β terms, see Remark 3 for a
detailed discussion.
8 Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han
3 Multi-player two-strategy games
We provide mathematical analysis of the expected density function f2,d(t) and
the expected number of equilibria E(2, d) for a multi-player two-strategy game.
Section 3.1 presents asymptotic behaviour. A connection to Legendre polyno-
mials and its applications are given in 3.2. In Section 3.2, further applications
of this connection to study monotonicity of the density function are explored.
3.1 Asymptotic behaviour of the density and the expected number of
equilibria
In the case of multi-player two-strategy games (n = 2), the system of polyno-
mial equations in (2) becomes a univariate polynomial equation
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk (1− y)d−1−k = 0, (8)
where y is the fraction of strategy 1 (i.e., 1 − y is that of strategy 2) and
βk is the payoff to strategy 1 minus that to strategy 2 obtained in a d-player
interaction with k other participants using strategy 1. It is worth noticing that
bk,d :=
(
d− 1
k
)
yk (1− y)d−1−k, k = 0, . . . , d− 1, (9)
is the Bernstein basis polynomials of degree d− 1 [42,32]. Therefore, the left-
hand side of (8) is a random Bernstein polynomial of degree d − 1. As a
by-product of our analysis, see Theorem 2, we will later obtain an asymptotic
formula of the expected real zeros of a random Bernstein polynomial.
Letting t = y1−y (t ∈ R+), Eq. (8) is simplified to
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
tk = 0. (10)
The expected density of real zeros of this equation at a point t is f2,d(t).
For simplicity of notation, from now on we write fd(t) instead of f2,d(t). We
recall some properties of the density function fd(t) from [14, Proposition 1]
that will be used in the sequel.
Proposition 1 ([14]) The following properties hold
1) fd(0) =
d−1
pi , fd(1) =
d−1
2pi
1√
2d−3 .
2) fd(t) =
1
2pi
[
1
tG
′(t)
] 1
2 , where
G(t) = t
d
dtMd(t)
Md(t)
= t
d
dt
logMd(t) with Md(t) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k.
(11)
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3) fd(t) has an alternative representation
(2pifd(t))
2 =
d−1∑
i=1
4ri
(t2 + ri)2
, (12)
where ri > 0 satisfies that Md(t) =
d−1∏
i=1
(t2 + ri).
4) t 7→ fd(t) is a decreasing function.
5) fd
(
1
t
)
= t2f(t).
6) E(2, d) =
∫∞
0
fd(t) dt = 2
∫ 1
0
fd(t) dt.
Example 1 Below are some examples of fd(t), with d = 2, 3 and 4
f2(t) =
1
pi
1
1 + t2
, f3(t) =
2
pi
√
1 + t2 + t4
1 + 4t2 + t4
, f4(t) =
3
pi
√
1 + 4t2 + 10t4 + 4t6 + t8
1 + 9t2 + 9t4 + t6
.
We recall that t = y1−y , where y is the fraction of strategy 1. We can write
the density in terms of y using the change of variable formula as follows.
fd(t) dt = fd
( y
1− y
) 1
(1− y)2 dy.
Define gd(y) to be the density on the right-hand side of the above expression,
i.e.,
gd(y) := fd
( y
1− y
) 1
(1− y)2 . (13)
The following lemma is an interesting property of the density function gd,
which explains the symmetry of the strategies (swapping the index labels con-
verts an equilibrium at y to one at 1 − y). Numerical simulations in Section
4.2 further illustrate this property (see Figure 6).
Lemma 2 The function y 7→ gd(y) is symmetric about the line y = 12 , i.e.,
gd(y) = gd(1− y).
Proof We have
gd(1− y) = fd
(1− y
y
) 1
y2
= fd
( y
1− y
) y2
(1− y)2
1
y2
= fd
( y
1− y
) 1
(1− y)2 = gd(y),
where we have used the fifth property in Proposition 1 to obtain the second
equality above.
The following theorem provides an upper bound and asymptotic behaviour
for fd(t) and its scaling with respect to d.
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Theorem 1 (Asymptotic behaviour of the density function) The fol-
lowing statement holds
fd(t) ≤ min
{√
d− 1
2pi t
,
d− 1
pi
}
for t ≥ 0. (14)
As a consequence, for any given t > 0
fd(t)
d− 1 ≤
1
pi
, lim
d→∞
fd(t)
d− 1 = 0, (15)
and furthermore
fd(t) ∼
√
d− 1. (16)
Proof It follows from the first and the fourth properties in Proposition 1 that
fd(t) ≤ fd(0) = d− 1
pi
. (17)
On the other hand, according to the third property in Proposition 1, we have
(2pifd(t))
2 =
d−1∑
i=1
4ri
(t2 + ri)2
.
Since (t2 + ri)
2 ≥ 4 rit2, it follows that for any t 6= 0
(2pifd(t))
2 ≤
d−1∑
i=1
1
t2
=
d− 1
t2
,
which is equivalent to fd(t) ≤
√
d−1
2pi t . Hence, the upper bound of fd(t) in (14)
holds.
The upper bound and limit in (15) are obvious consequences of (14). It
remains to prove the asymptotic behaviour of fd(t) as a function of d. Using
(14) and the fourth property in Proposition 1, it follows that, for 0 < t ≤ 1
d− 1
2pi
1√
2d− 3 = fd(1) ≤ fd(t) ≤
√
d− 1
2pi t
,
and for t ≥ 1
1
t2
d− 1
2pi
1√
2d− 3 =
1
t2
fd(1) ≤ 1
t2
fd
(
1
t
)
= fd(t) ≤ fd(1) = d− 1
2pi
1√
2d− 3 .
From these estimates, we deduce that fd(t) ∼
√
d− 1 for any t > 0.
We numerically illustrate Theorem 1 in Section 4.2, see Figures 1.
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Theorem 2 (Asymptotic behaviour of E(2, d)) It holds that
√
d− 1 . E(2, d) . √d− 1 ln(d− 1). (18)
Furthermore, we obtain the following asymptotic formula for E(2, d)
lim
d→∞
lnE(2, d)
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
. (19)
We first provide a proof of this theorem. Then we discuss its implications
for the expected number of stable equilibrium points in a random game and
that of real zeros of a random Bernstein polynomial in Corollaries 1 and 2. A
comparision with well-known results in the theory of random polynomials is
given in Remark 1.
Proof The lower bound was derived previously in [14, Theorem 2]. For the
sake of completeness, we provide it again here. Using the sixth and the fourth
properties in Proposition 1, we have E(2, d) = 2
∫ 1
0
fd(t) dt ≥ 2
∫ 1
0
f(1) dt =
2f(1) = d−1
pi
√
2d−3 . Therefore,
√
d− 1 . E(2, d).
The underlying idea of the proof for the upper bound is to split the integral
range in the formula of E(2, d) into two intervals. The first one is from 0 to
α, for some α ∈ (0, 1); we then estimate fd(t) in this interval by fd(0). The
second one is from α to 1, which is estimated using the upper bound of fd(t)
given in (14). The value of α will then be optimized.
E(2, d) = 2
∫ 1
0
fd(t) dt = 2
[∫ α
0
fd(t) dt+
∫ 1
α
fd(t) dt
]
≤ 2
[
αfd(0) +
√
d− 1
2pi
∫ 1
α
1
t
dt
]
=
1
pi
[
2(d− 1)α−√d− 1 lnα
]
. (20)
Let h(α) be the expression inside the square brackets in the right-hand side
of (20). To obtain the optimal (i.e. smallest) upper bound, we minimize h(α)
with respect to α. The optimal value of α satisfies the following equation
d
dα
h(α) = 2(d− 1)−
√
d− 1
α
= 0,
which leads to α = 1
2
√
d−1 . Substituting this value into (20), we obtain
E(2, d) ≤
√
d− 1
pi
(
1 + ln 2 +
1
2
ln(d− 1)
)
.
It follows that E(2, d) .
√
d− 1 ln(d− 1), which is (18).
We now prove (19). By taking logarithm in (18), we obtain
1
2
ln(d− 1) . lnE(2, d) . 1
2
ln(d− 1) + ln ln(d− 1).
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Therefore
1
2
. lnE(2, d)
ln(d− 1) .
1
2
+
ln ln(d− 1)
ln(d− 1) . (21)
Since lim
d→∞
ln ln(d−1)
ln(d−1) = 0, we achieve (19).
Theorem 2 has two interesting implications about the expected number of
stable equilibrium points in a random game and that of real zeros of a random
Bernstein polynomial.
Corollary 1 The expected number of stable equilibrium points in a random
game with d players and two strategies, SE (2, d), satisfies
√
d− 1
2
. SE (2, d) . 1
2
√
d− 1 ln(d− 1), (22)
and furthermore, satisfies the following limiting behaviour
lim
d→∞
ln SE (2, d)
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
. (23)
Proof From [22, Theorem 3], it is known that an equilibrium in a random game
with two strategies and an arbitrary number of players, is stable with prob-
ability 1/2. Thus, SE (2, d) = E(2,d)2 . Hence, the corollary is clearly followed
from Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 The expected number of real zeros, EB, of a random Bernstein
polynomial
B(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk (1− x)d−1−k,
where βk are independent standard normal distributions, satisfies
√
d− 1 . EB .
√
d− 1 ln(d− 1), lim
d→∞
lnEB
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
. (24)
Proof As mentioned beneath (8), solving B(x) = 0 is equivalent to solving
Eq. (10). It follows that fd(t) is the expected density of real zeros of B(x).
Therefore, EB given by
EB =
∫ ∞
−∞
fd(t) dt = 2
∫ ∞
0
fd(t) dt = 2E(2, d). (25)
Note that the second equality in (25) holds because fd(t) is even in t due
to (12). The asymptotic behaviour (24) of EB is then followed directly from
Theorem 2.
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Remark 1 The study of the distribution and expected number of real zeros of
a random polynomial is an active research field with a long history dating back
to 1932 with Block and Po´lya [6], see for instance [15] for a nice exposition
and [45,38] for the most recent results and discussions. Consider a random
polynomial of the type
Pd(z) =
d−1∑
i=0
ci ξi z
i. (26)
The most well-known classes of polynomials studied extensively in the litera-
ture are: flat polynomials or Weyl polynomials for ci :=
1
i! , elliptic polynomials
(EP) or binomial polynomials for ci :=
√(
d− 1
i
)
and Kac polynomials for
ci := 1. We emphasize the difference between the polynomial studied in this
paper, i.e. the right-hand side of Eq. (10), with the elliptic polynomial: in our
case ci =
(
d− 1
i
)
are binomial coefficients, not their square root as in the
elliptic polynomial. In the former case, v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)
xiyi =
(1 + xy)d−1, and as a result the density function and the expected number of
real zeros have closed formula, see [15]
fEP (t) =
√
d− 1
pi(1 + t2)
, EEP =
√
d− 1.
Our case is more challenging, because of the square in the coefficients,
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)2
xiyi is no longer a generating function. Nev-
ertheless, Theorem 2 shows that E(2, d) still has interesting asymptotic be-
haviour as in (18) and (19).
3.2 Connections to Legendre polynomials and other qualitative properties
In this section, we first establish a connection between the expected density
function fd and the well-known Legendre polynomials. Then using the connec-
tion and known properties of Legendre polynomials, we prove some qualitative
properties of fd and the expected number of equilibria. The main results of
this section can be summarised as follows.
(i) Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 derive an expression for the expected density
fd in terms of the Legendre polynomials.
(ii) Theorem 5 shows that fd(t)d−1 is an increasing function of d for any given
t > 0.
(iii) Corollary 4 proves that E(2,d)d−1 and
SE(2,d)
d−1 are decreasing functions of d.
Technically, keys to these theorems are Lemma 3 that connects the Legendre
polynomials Pd to Md+1 in (11), and Lemma 4 showing a reverse Turan’s
inequality. These lemmas are of interest in their own right.
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3.2.1 Legendre polynomials
We recall some relevant details on Legendre polynomials. Legendre polynomi-
als, denoted by Pd(x), are solutions to Legendre’s differential equation
d
dx
[
(1− x2) d
dx
Pd(x)
]
+ d(d+ 1)Pd(x) = 0, (27)
with initial data P0(x) = 1, P1(x) = x. The following are some important
properties of the Legendre polynomials that will be used in the sequel.
(1) Explicit representation
Pd(x) =
1
2d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2
(x− 1)d−i(x+ 1)i. (28)
(2) Recursive relation
(d+ 1)Pd+1(x) = (2d+ 1)xPd(x)− dPd−1(x). (29)
(3) First derivative relation
x2 − 1
d
P ′d(x) = xPd(x)− Pd−1(x). (30)
Example 2 The first few Legendre polynomials are
P0(x) = 1, P1(x) = x, P2(x) =
1
2
(3x2 − 1), P3(x) = 1
2
(5x3 − 3x),
P4(x) =
1
8
(35x4 − 30x2 + 3).
The Legendre polynomials were first introduced in 1782 by A. M. Legen-
dre as the coefficients in the expansion of the Newtonian potential [33]. This
expansion gives the gravitational potential associated to a point mass or the
Coulomb potential associated to a point charge. In the course of time, Legendre
polynomials have been widely used in Physics and Engineering. For instance,
they occur when one solves Laplace’s equation (and related partial differential
equations) in spherical coordinates [5].
Our approach reveals an appealing, and previously unexplored relationship
between Legendre polynomials and evolutionary game theory. We explore this
relationship and its applications in the next sections.
3.2.2 From Legendre polynomials to evolutionary games
The starting point of our analysis is the following relation between the poly-
nomial Md+1(t) in (11) and the Legendre polynomial Pd.
Lemma 3 It holds that
Md+1(t) = (1− t2)d Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
. (31)
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 15
Proof See Appendix 6.1.
Note that traditionally in the Legendre polynomials, the arguments are in
[−1, 1]. In this paper, however, the arguments are not in this interval since∣∣ 1+t2
1−t2
∣∣ ≥ 1. Legendre polynomials with arguments greater than unity have
been used in the literature, for instance in [13, Chapter 2]. We now establish a
connection between the density fd(t) and the Legendre polynomials. According
to the second property in Proposition 1, we have
fd+1(t) =
1
2pi
[
1
t
(
t
M ′d+1(t)
Md+1(t)
)′] 12
, (32)
where ′ denotes the derivative with respect to t. Using this formula and Lemma
3, we obtain the following expression of fd+1(t) in terms of Pd(t) and its
derivative.
Theorem 3 (Expression of the density in terms of the Legrendre
polynomial and its derivative) The following formula holds
(2pi fd+1(t))
2 =
4d2
(1− t2)2 −
16t2
(1− t2)4
(
P ′d
Pd
)2(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
(33)
Proof See Appendix 6.2.
Corollary 3 As a direct consequence of (33), we obtain the following bound
for f2,d(t).
fd(t) ≤ 1
pi
d− 1
1− t2 . (34)
In comparison with the estimate (14) obtained in Theorem 1, this inequality
is weaker for t > 0 since it is of order O(d− 1). However, it does not blow up
as t approaches 0.
We provide another expression of fd+1(t) in terms of two consecutive Legendre
polynomials Pd−1 and Pd. In comparison with (33), this formula avoids the
computations of the derivative of the Legendre polynomial Pd.
Theorem 4 (Expression of the density function in terms of two Leg-
endre polynomials) It holds that
(2pifd+1(t))
2 =
4d2
(1− t2)2 −
d2
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
. (35)
Proof See Appendix 6.3
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3.2.3 Monotonicity of the densities
Theorem 4 is crucial for the subsequent qualitative study of the density f2,d(t)
for varying d.
Lemma 4 The following inequality holds for all |x| ≥ 1
Pd(x)
2 ≤ Pd+1(x)Pd−1(x). (36)
Proof See Appendix 6.4.
Note that this inequality is the reverse of the Tura´n inequality [47] where
the author considered the case x ∈ [−1, 1].
Theorem 5 For any given t > 0, fd(t)d−1 is a decreasing function of d.
Proof We need to prove that
fd+1(t)
d
≥ fd+2(t)
d+ 1
.
From (35), we have
4pi2
(
fd+1(t)
d
)2
=
4
(1− t2)2 −
1
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
. (37)
Assume that x ≥ 1. Then Pd(x) > 0 for all d and from (29), we have
(d+ 1)Pd+1(x) ≥ (2d+ 1)Pd(x)− dPd−1(x),
which implies that
(d+1)(Pd+1(x)−Pd(x)) ≥ d(Pd(x)−Pd−1(x)) ≥ · · · ≥ 1(P1(x)−P0(x)) = x−1 ≥ 0.
Therefore Pd+1(x) ≥ Pd(x) for all x ≥ 1. We first consider the case 0 ≤ t < 1.
From Lemma 4 for x = 1+t
2
1−t2 ≥ 1, we have
P 2d
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
≤ Pd−1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
Pd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
,
or equivalently
Pd
Pd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
≤ Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
≤ 1 ≤ 1 + t
2
1− t2 .
It follows that[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
≤
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd
Pd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
.
From this inequality and (37) as well as a similar formula for fd+2, we obtain
fd+1(t)
d
≥ fd+2(t)
d+ 1
,
which is the claimed property for the case 0 ≤ t < 1. The case t ≥ 1 is then
followed due to the relation fd(t) =
1
t2 fd
(
1
t
)
.
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Since E(2, d) =
∫∞
0
fd(t) dt and SE (2, d) =
E(2,d)
2 , the following statement is
an obvious consequence of Theorem 5.
Corollary 4 E(2,d)d−1 and
SE(2,d)
d−1 are decreasing functions of d.
The following proposition is a necessary and sufficient condition, which is
stated in terms of the Legendre polynomials, for fd+1(t) being increasing as a
function of d.
Proposition 2 fd+1(t) is an increasing function of d if and only if, for x =
1+t2
1−t2
(d+ 1)2[P 2d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] · [P 2d+1(x) + P 2d (x)− 2xPd+1(x)Pd(x)]
+ (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d+1(x) ≥ 0. (38)
Furthermore, if
(2d+ 1)P 4d ≥ P 2d−1
[
(2d− 1)P 2d+1 + 2P 2d
]
(39)
then (38) holds.
Proof See Appendix 6.5.
We numerically verify the inequality (39) in Figure 2; however, it is unclear
to us how to prove it rigorously. We also recall that it is shown in Theorem
1 that fd(t) behaves like
√
d− 1, which is an increasing function of d, as d
is sufficiently large. Motivated by these observations, we make the following
prediction.
Conjecture 1 For any given t > 0, fd(t) is an increasing function of d.
We provide further numerical simulation to support this Conjecture by
directly plotting fd(t) in Figure 1c.
Remark 2 We recall that in the case n = 2, the variable t is defined by t = y1−y ,
where y is the fraction of strategy 1 and 1−y is that of strategy 2. Equivalently,
y can be expressed in terms of t as y = t1+t . Hence one can also transform the
statements of the theorem above (and later) in terms of y. As has been shown in
the beginning of Section 2, the transformation from y to t has the advantage
that it transforms a complex equation (Eq. (8)) to a univariate polynomial
equation (Eq. (10)). This enables us to exploit many available results and
techniques from the literature of random polynomial theory. Moreover, from
the relationship between f(t) and g(y), it follows that all the monotonicity
properties with respect to d are reserved for g2,d (see a numerical illustration
in Figure 6).
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4 General Cases
In this section, first we prove an estimate for the density fn,2(t) similarly as
in Theorem 1 for a two-player multi-strategy game. The expected number of
internal equilibria in this case has been computed explicitly in [14, Theorem
3]. We then conjecture an asymptotic formula for the general case. Finally, we
provide numerical simulations to support our conjectures, as well as the main
results in the previous sections.
4.1 Two-player multi-strategy games
Theorem 6 (two-player multi-strategy games)
Assume that {Ai = (βij)j=1,··· ,n−1; i = 1, . . . , n− 1} are independent random
vectors, then it holds that
fn,2(t) = pi
−n2 Γ
(n
2
)
if t1 · · · tn−1 = 0 and (40)
fn,2(t) ≤ pi−n2 Γ
(n
2
)
min
{
1,
1
n
n
2 t1 · · · tn−1
}
if t1 · · · tn−1 6= 0. (41)
As a consequence, for any t such that t1 · · · tn−1 6= 0
lim
n→∞
fn,2(t)
pi−
n
2 Γ
(
n
2
) = 0. (42)
Proof According to [14, Theorem 3]
fn,2(t) = pi
−n2 Γ
(n
2
) 1(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
)n
2
. (43)
The first assertion is then followed. Now suppose that t1 · · · tn−1 6= 0. By the
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, which states
∑n
i=1 an ≥ n(a1 · · · an)
1
n for n all n
positive numbers a1, · · · , an, we have(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
)n
2
≥ nn2 t1 · · · tn−1.
Therefore
fn,2(t) ≤ pi−n2 Γ
(n
2
) 1
n
n
2 t1 · · · tn−1
.
On the other hand, since
(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
)n
2
≥ 1, it follows that
fn,2(t) ≤ pi−n2 Γ
(n
2
)
.
Therefore, we obtain (41).
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Note that the expected number of internal equilibria for a two-player multi-
strategy game is given by [14, Theorem 3]
E(n, 2) =
1
2n−1
.
Table 1 Expected number of internal equilibria for n = 3 and different d, as generated
from E(3, d) and from averaging over 106 random samples of the system of equation in 2.
In all cases, results from random samplings are slightly smaller E(3, d).
d 2 3 4 5
E(3, d) from Theory 0.25 0.57 0.92 1.29
E(3, d) from Random Sampling 0.249496 0.569169 0.910236 1.28898
Remark 3 In Theorem 6, we need an assumption that the random vectors
{Ai = (βij)j=1,··· ,n−1; i = 1, . . . , n−1} are independent. Recalling from Section
2 that βik1,...,kn−1 = α
i
k1,...,kn
− αnk1,...,kn , where αii1,...,id−1 is the payoff of the
focal player, with i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) being the strategy of the focal player, and
ik (with 1 ≤ ik ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) is the strategy of the player in
position k. The assumption clearly holds for n = 2. For n > 2, the assumption
holds only under quite restrictive conditions such as αnk1,...,kn is deterministic
or αik1,...,kn are essentially identical. Note that the assumption is necessary
to apply [15, Theorem 7.1]. Hence, to remove this assumption, one would
need to generalize [15, Theorem 7.1]. This is difficult and is still an open
problem [30,31]. Nevertheless, since the system (3) has not been studied in
the mathematical literature, it is interesting on its own to investigate the
number of real zeros of this system under the assumption of independence of
{Ai}. As such, the investigation not only provides new insights into the theory
of zeros of systems of random polynomials but also gives important hint on
the complexity of the game theoretical question, i.e. the number of expected
number of equilibria. In Figure 7 and Table 1, we numerically compare the
density function g3,d and the expected number of equilibria E3,d computed
from the theory with the above assumption and from samplings without the
assumption. We observe that g3,d have the same shape (behaviour) in both
cases. In addition, the values of E3,d computed from samplings are slightly
smaller than those computed from the theory.
We now make a conjecture for the expected density and expected number
of equilibria in a general multi-player multi-strategy game.
Conjecture 2 In a multi-player multi-strategy game, it holds that
fn,d ∼ (d− 1)
n−1
2 and lim
d→∞
lnE(n, d)
ln(d− 1) =
n− 1
2
. (44)
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We envisage that even a stronger statement holds
E(n, d) ∼ (d− 1)n−12 . (45)
This conjecture is motivated from Theorem 2 and a similar result for the sys-
tem of multivariate elliptic polynomial as follows (see also Remark 1). Consider
a system of n− 1 random polynomials, each of the form
∑
0≤k1,...,kn≤d−1,
n∑
i=1
ki=d−1
βk1,...,kn
√(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n∏
i=1
xkii , (46)
where the coefficients βk1,...,kn are independent standard multivariate normal
distribution. Then according to [15, Section 7.2], the expected density and the
expected number of real zeros are given by
fEP (t) = pi
−n2 Γ
(n
2
) (d− 1)n−12
(1 + t · t)n2 , EEP = (d− 1)
n−1
2 . (47)
These formula are direct consequences of Lemma 1 and the fact that v(x)Cv(y)
is a generating function, which generalises the univariate case
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑
0≤k1,...,kn≤d−1,
n∑
i=1
ki=d−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n∏
i=1
xkiyki = (1 + x · y)d−1.
As mentioned in Remark 1, in our case v(x)TCv(y) is no longer a generating
function due to the square of the multinomial coefficients. Motivated by this
and Theorem 2 for the univariate case, we expect that the conjecture holds
for the general case (i.e. d-player n-strategy normal evolutionary games).
4.2 Numerical results
In this section, we provide numerical simulations for all the (main) results
obtained in the previous sections. The following figures are plotted. In the
following list, (1) to (4) are to illustrate and confirm the analytical results
obtained in the previous sections. The others, from (5) to (10), are numerical
simulations for the games with large d and n. They also provide numerical
support for Conjecture 2.
(1) fd(t) and fd(t)/(d−1) as functions of t for different values of d, see Figures
1a-b. Figure 1a illustrates the fourth property in Proposition 1 that fd(t)
is increasing as a function of t. Figure 1b explains the scaling by showing
that fd(t)/(d− 1) is a bounded and decreasing function.
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(2) fd(t) and fd(t)/(d−1) as functions of d for different values of t, see Figures
1c-d. These figures show that fd(t) increases with d while fd(t)/(d − 1)
decreases, which are in agreement with Conjecture 1 and Theorem 5.
(3) fd(x) and fd(x)/(d− 1) as functions of the frequency x.
(4) lnE(2,d)ln(d−1) as a function of d, see Figure 3a. This figure demonstrates Theo-
rem 2 on the convergence of lnE(2,d)ln(d−1) to 1/2 as d tends to infinity.
(5) f3,d(t1, t2) as a function of t = (t1, t2) for different values of d, see Figures
5a-c.
(6) f3,d(t1, t2) as a function of d for different values of t = (t1, t2), see Figure
4a.
(7) f4,d(t1, t2, t3) as a function of t = (t1, t2, t3) for different values of d, see
Figures 5d-f.
(8) f4,d(t1, t2, t3) as a function of d for different values of t = (t1, t2, t3), see
Figure 4b.
(9) lnE(3,d)ln(d−1) as a function of d, see Figure 3b.
(10) lnE(4,d)ln(d−1) as a function of d, see Figure 3c.
In Figures 5, we provide numerical results of fn,d(t) for n = 3 and n = 4.
We observe that the density function decreases with ti (namely, t1 and t2 for
n = 3, and t1, t2 and t3 for n = 4) and increases with d. We conjecture that for
the general d-player n-strategy normal evolutionary game, the density function
decreases with ti and increases with d.
Figures 3b and 3c support Conjecture 2. From these two figures, one also
can see the complexity of the problem when d increases. We are able to run
simulations for d up to 10000 for n = 2, up to 400 for n = 3 and only up to
20 for n = 4.
5 Discussion and outlook
How do equilibrium points in a general evolutionary game distribute if the pay-
off matrix entries are randomly drawn, and furthermore, how do they behave
when the numbers of players and strategies change? To address these impor-
tant questions regarding generic properties of general evolutionary games, we
have analyzed here the density function, fn,d, and the expected number of (sta-
ble) equilibrium points, E(n, d) (respectively, SE (n, d)), in a normal d-player
n-strategy evolutionary game. We have shown, analytically and using numer-
ical simulations, that f2,d(t) monotonically decreases with t while it increases
with d. The latter implies that, as the number of players in the game increases,
it is more likely to see an equilibrium at a given point t. We also proved that
its scaling with respect to the number of players in a game d,
f2,d(t)
d , decreases
with d. More interestingly, we proved that this density function asymptoti-
cally behaves in the same manner as
√
d− 1 at any given t (i.e. regardless of
the equilibrium point). Similar monotonicity behaviors of the density function
were observed numerically for games with larger numbers of strategies n. Ad-
ditionally, we proved an upper bound for two-player game with an arbitrary
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Fig. 1 (a) Plot of f2,d(t) and (b) of f2,d(t)/(d − 1) as functions of t, for different
values of d. We observe that both functions decrease with t, which are in accordance with
Proposition 1. The second function is bounded from above, having maximum at t = 0, which
agrees with Theorem 1. (c) Plot of f2,d(t) and (d) of f2,d(t)/(d− 1) as functions of d,
for different values of t. We observe that f2,d(t) increases with d, while f2,d(t)/(d − 1)
decreases, which are in agreement with Conjecture 1 and Theorem 5. All the results were
obtained numerically using Mathematica.
number of strategies, n. Briefly, our analysis of the expected density of equi-
librium points has offered clear and fresh understanding about equilibrium
distribution. Related to this distribution analysis, there have been some works
analyzing patterns of ESSs and their attainability in concrete games, i.e. with
a fixed payoff matrix [49,11,8]. Differently, our analysis addresses distribution
of the general equilibrium points, and for generic games. Note also that those
works dealt with two-player games while we address here the general case (i.e.
with arbitrary d).
Regarding the expected numbers of internal (stable) equilibrium points,
first of all, as a result of the described monotonicity properties of the density
function, we established analytically that E(2, d) and SE (2, d) increase with d
while their scaled forms, E(2,d)d and
SE(2,d)
d , decrease with d. Next, we proved
a new upper bounds for n = 2, with arbitrary d: E(2, d) .
√
d− 1 ln(d − 1).
This upper bound is sharper than the one described in [14] (which is also the
only known one, to the best of our knowledge). As a consequence, a sharper
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Fig. 2 Plot of Ld(x) := (2d+ 1)P
4
d−P 2d−1
[
(2d− 1)P 2d+1 + 2P 2d
]
for different values of d.
We observe that Ld(x) is always non-negative, thereby supporting Conjecture 1, since the
inequality Ld(x) ≥ 0 is the sufficient condition for the conjecture, as shown in Proposition
2
.
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Fig. 3 Plot of
lnE(n,d)
ln(d−1) as functions of d, (a) for n = 2, (b) for n = 3 and (c) for
n = 4. The results confirm the asymptotic behaviour for n = 2 as described in Theorem
2, and clearly support Conjecture 2 for the general case. All the results were obtained
numerically using Mathematica.
upper bound for the number of expected number of stable equilibria can be
established: SE (2, d) . 12
√
d− 1 ln(d− 1). More importantly, that allowed us
to derive close-form limiting behaviors for such numbers: lim
d→∞
lnE(2,d)
ln(d−1) =
1
2
and lim
d→∞
lnSE(2,d)
ln(d−1) =
1
2 . As such, apart from the mathematical elegance of
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Fig. 4 Plot of (a) f3,d(t1, t2) for different values of (t1, t2) and (b) f4,d(t1, t2) for
different values of (t1, t2, t3), both as a function of d. We observe that the functions
increase with d while decrease with ti, with i = 1, 2 in panel (a) and i = 1, 2, 3 in panel (b).
All the results were obtained numerically using Mathematica.
our results, the analysis here has significantly improved existing results on the
studies of random evolutionary game theory [14,22,16]. Moreover, generalizing
these formulas for the general case, i.e. when the number of strategies n is also
arbitrary, our conjecture that, lim
d→∞
lnE(n,d)
ln(d−1) =
n−1
2 , is nicely corroborated by
numerical simulations. Related to this analysis, there have been some works
analyzing ESS in random evolutionary games [19,29,25]. In both [19] and [29],
the authors focused on the asymptotic behaviour of ESS with large support
sizes, i.e. considering also equilibrium points which are not internal, in random
pairwise games. In a similar context, in [25], the authors studied ESS but
with support size of two, showing the asymptotic behaviors of such ESS when
the number of strategies varies. Differently from all these works (which dealt
exclusively with two-player interactions), our analysis copes with multi-player
games. Hence, our results have led to further understanding with respect to the
asymptotic behaviour of the expected number of stable equilibria for multi-
player random games.
Last but not least, as the density functions we analyzed here are closely re-
lated to Legendre polynomials, and actually, they are of the same form as the
Bernstein polynomials, we have made a clear contribution to the longstanding
theory of random polynomials [6,15,45,38](see again discussion in introduc-
tion). We have derived asymptotic behaviors for the expected real zeros EB of a
random Bernstein polynomial, which, to our knowledge, had not been provided
before. Note that the asymptotic behaviors and close forms of the expected
real zeros of some other well-known polynomials have been derived by other
authors. For instance, the Weyl polynomials for ai :=
1
i! ; the elliptic polynomi-
als or binomial polynomials with ai :=
√(
d− 1
i
)
; and Kac polynomials with
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Fig. 5 Plot of (a-c) f3,d(t1, t2) as a function of (t1, t2); and (d-f) f4,d(t1, t2) as a
function of (t1, t2), for different values of t3. We observe that both functions increase
with d while decrease with ti, with i = 1, 2 in panels (a)-(c) and i = 1, 2, 3 in panels (d)-(f).
In panels (a) and (d), d = 2; in panels (b) and (e), d = 5; in panels (c) and (f), d = 10. In
panels (d)-(f), the surfaces, from bottom to top, correspond to t3 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and
10, respectively. All the results were obtained numerically using Mathematica.
ai := 1. The difference between the polynomial studied here (i.e. Bernstein)
with the elliptic case: ai =
(
d− 1
i
)
are binomial coefficients, not their square
root. In the elliptic case, v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)
xiyi = (1 + xy)d−1,
and as a result, E(2, d) =
√
d− 1; While in our case, because of the square in
the coefficients, v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)2
xiyi, is no longer a generating
function. Indeed, due to this difficulty, the analysis of the Bernstein polyno-
mials is still rather limited, see for instance [3] for a detailed discussion.
In short, our analysis has provided new understanding about the generic
behaviors of equilibrium points in a general evolutionary game, namely, how
they distribute and change in number when the number of players and that of
the strategies in the game, are magnified.
6 Appendix
Detailed proofs of some lemmas and theorems in the previous sections are
presented in this appendix.
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Fig. 7 (Top row) Plot of the density function g3,d(y1, y2) for different values of d (here
y1 and y2 are fractions of strategy 1 and 2, respectively, and 1− y1 − y2 is that of the third
strategy). (Bottom row) Probability histograms plots of results from solving the system of
equations 2 with n = 3 and for different d, where the payoff entries α’s are (independently)
sampled from Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation of 0.5 (106 samples
in total). The probability histograms have similar shapes to g3,d(y1, y2) (see also Table 1).
All the results were obtained numerically using Mathematica.
6.1 Proof of Lemma 3
This relation has appeared in [18, Exercise 101, Chapter 5]. For the readers’
convenience, we provide a proof here.
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Proof (Proof of Lemma 3) Let x = 1+q1−q , from (28) we have
Pd
(
1 + q
1− q
)
=
1
2d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2(
1 + q
1− q − 1
)d−i(
1 + q
1− q + 1
)i
=
1
2d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2(
2q
1− q
)d−i(
2
1− q
)i
=
1
(1− q)d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2
qd−i
=
1
(1− q)d
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2
qi.
Therefore,
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)2
qi = (1− q)dPd
(
1 + q
1− q
)
.
By taking q = t2, we obtain (31).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3 )
By taking the derivative of both sides in (31), we obtain
M ′d+1(t) = −2 t d (1− t2)d−1Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
+ 4t(1− t2)d−2P ′d
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
= −2 t d Md+1(t)
1− t2 + 4t(1− t
2)d−2P ′d
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
.
It follows that
M ′d+1(t)
Md+1(t)
=
−2 t d
1− t2 +
4t
(1− t2)2
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
.
Now we compute the expression inside the square-root of the right-hand side
of (32). We have
t
M ′d+1(t)
Md+1(t)
=
−2 t2 d
1− t2 +
4t2
(1− t2)2
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
,
and(
t
M ′d+1(t)
Md+1(t)
)′
= − 4 t d
(1− t2)2+
8t(1 + t2)
(1− t2)3
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
+
16t3
(1− t2)4
P ′′d Pd − (P ′d)2
P 2d
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
.
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Substituting this expression into (33), we get
(2pifd+1(t))
2 = − 4 d
(1− t2)2+
8(1 + t2)
(1− t2)3
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
+
16t2
(1− t2)4
P ′′d Pd − (P ′d)2
P 2d
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
.
(48)
According to (27), the Legendre polynomial Pd satisfies the following equation
for all x ∈ R
−2xP ′d(x) + (1− x2)P ′′d (x) = −d(d+ 1)Pd(x).
As a consequence, we obtain
P ′′d (x)
Pd(x)
=
1
1− x2
(
2x
P ′d(x)
Pd(x)
− d(d+ 1)
)
.
Substituting this expression into (48) with x = 1+t
2
1−t2 , we get
(2pifd+1(t))
2 = − 4 d
(1− t2)2 +
8(1 + t2)
(1− t2)3
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
+
16t2
(1− t2)4
 11− ( 1+t21−t2)2
[
2
1 + t2
1− t2
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
− d(d+ 1)
]
−
(
P ′d
Pd
)2(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
=
4d2
(1− t2)2 −
16t2
(1− t2)4
(
P ′d
Pd
)2(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
,
which is the claimed relation (33).
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4) Using the following relation of the Legendre poly-
nomials for all x ∈ R
P ′d(x) =
d
x2 − 1 (xPd(x)− Pd−1(x)) ,
we get
P ′d(x)
Pd(x)
=
d
x2 − 1
(
x− Pd−1(x)
Pd(x)
)
. (49)
In particular, taking x = 1+t
2
1−t2 , we obtain
P ′d
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
=
d(
1+t2
1−t2
)2
− 1
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
=
d(1− t2)2
4t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
.
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Substituting this expression into (33), we achieve
(2pifd+1(t))
2 =
4d2
(1− t2)2 −
d2
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
,
which is (35).
6.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof (Proof of Lemma 4) This lemma follows directly from [12] (Theorem
2.1) where the authors proved that
Pd(x)
2 − Pd+1(x)Pd−1(x) = 1− x
2
d(d+ 1)
 d∑
i=1
1
i
+
d−1∑
i=1
1
i+ 1
i∑
j=1
(2j + 1)P 2j (x)
 ,
which is negative for all |x| ≥ 1.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof (Proof of Proposition 2) We will prove that
f2d+2(t)− f2d+1(t) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ (38). (50)
From (35), we have
4pi2(f2d+2(t)− f2d+1(t)) =
4(d+ 1)2
(1− t2)2 −
(d+ 1)2
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd
Pd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
− 4d
2
(1− t2)2 +
d2
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−1
Pd
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]2
=
4(2d+ 1)
(1− t2)2 −
1
t2
[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
(d+ 1)P 2d − dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
×[
(2d+ 1)
1 + t2
1− t2 −
(d+ 1)P 2d + dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
.
Therefore fd(t) is increasing as a function of d if and only if[
1 + t2
1− t2 −
(d+ 1)P 2d − dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
×
[
(2d+ 1)
1 + t2
1− t2 −
(d+ 1)P 2d + dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
≤ 4(2d+ 1)t
2
(1− t2)2 .
We re-write the expression above using the variable x, using the relation x2−
1 = 4t
2
(1−t2)2 , as follows[
x− (d+ 1)P
2
d − dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(x)
]
×
[
(2d+ 1)x− (d+ 1)P
2
d + dPd−1Pd+1
PdPd+1
(x)
]
≤ (2d+1)(x2−1).
(51)
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We now simplify this expression using the recursion relation of the Legendre
polynomials, i.e. dPd−1 = (2d+ 1)xPd − (d+ 1)Pd+1. Namely, we have
xPdPd+1 − (d+ 1)P 2d + dPd−1Pd+1 = xPdPd+1 − (d+ 1)P 2d + [(2d+ 1)xPd − (d+ 1)Pd+1]Pd+1
= (d+ 1)[−P 2d − P 2d+1 + 2xPdPd+1]
and
(2d+ 1)xPdPd+1 − (d+ 1)P 2d − dPd−1Pd+1
= (2d+ 1)xPdPd+1 − (d+ 1)P 2d − [(2d+ 1)xPd − (d+ 1)Pd+1]Pd+1
= (d+ 1)(P 2d+1 − P 2d ).
Substituting these calculations into (51) we obtain (38).
To prove the second assertion of Proposition 2, we proceed as follows. Let
Hd+1 = (d+ 1)
2
[
P 2d+1(x) + P
2
d (x)− 2xPd+1(x)Pd(x)
]
= [(2d+ 1)xPd(x)− dPd−1(x)]2 + (d+ 1)2P 2d (x)
− 2x(d+ 1) [(2d+ 1)xPd(x)− dPd−1(x)]Pd(x)
=
[
(2d+ 1)2x2 + (d+ 1)2 − 2(d+ 1)(2d+ 1)x2]P 2d (x)
− [2d(2d+ 1)x− 2d(d+ 1)x]Pd(x)Pd−1(x) + d2P 2d−1(x)
=
[
d2 + (2d+ 1)(1− x2)]P 2d (x) + d2P 2d−1(x)− 2xd2Pd(x)Pd−1(x)
= d2
[
P 2d (x) + P
2
d−1(x)− 2xPd(x)Pd−1(x)
]
+ (2d+ 1)(1− x2)P 2d (x)
= Hd + (2d+ 1)(1− x2)P 2d (x).
Hence, the expression in (38) can be simplified as follows
Hd+1[P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] + (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d+1(x)
= [Hd + (2d+ 1)(1− x2)P 2d (x)][P 2d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] + (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d+1(x)
= Hd[P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] + (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 4d (x)
=
P 2d+1(x)− P 2d (x)
P 2d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
[
Hd
(
P 2d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
)
+ (2d− 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d−1(x) ·Q
]
,
where Q =
(2d+1)P 2d (P
2
d−P 2d−1)
(2d−1)P 2d−1(P 2d+1−P 2d )
. Suppose that (39) is true, i.e.,
(2d+ 1)P 4d ≥ P 2d−1
[
(2d− 1)P 2d+1 + 2P 2d
]
.
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This implies that Q ≥ 1 for all x and d. Then it follows that
Hd+1[P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] + (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d+1(x)
≥ P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)
P 2d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
[
Hd
(
P 2d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
)
+ (2d− 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d−1(x)
]
≥ P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)
P 2d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
× P
2
d (x)− P 2d−1(x)
P 2d−1(x)− P 2d−2(x)
× [Hd−1 (P 2d−1(x)− P 2d−2(x))+ (2d− 3)(x2 − 1)P 2d−1(x)P 2d−2(x)]
≥ · · ·
≥
d∏
i=1
P 2i+1(x)− P 2i (x)
P 2i (x)− P 2i−1(x)
× [H1 (P 21 (x)− P 20 (x))+ (x2 − 1)P 21 (x)P 20 (x)] .
(52)
By definition of Hd, we have
H1 = P
2
1 (x) + P
2
0 (x)− 2xP1(x)P0(x) = x2 + 1− 2x2 = 1− x2.
Substituting this into (52), we obtain
Hd+1[P
2
d+1(x)− P 2d (x)] + (2d+ 1)(x2 − 1)P 2d (x)P 2d+1(x)
≥ (x2 − 1)
d∏
i=1
P 2i+1(x)− P 2i (x)
P 2i (x)− P 2i−1(x)
= P 2d+1(x)− P 2d (x) ≥ 0,
i.e., the condition (38) is satisfied.
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